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Abstract
Background: Mental health and poverty are strongly interlinked. There is a gap in the literature on the effects of
poverty alleviation programmes on mental health. We aim to fill this gap by studying the effect of an exogenous
income shock generated by the Child Support Grant, South Africa’s largest Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT)
programme, on mental health.
Methods: We use biennial data on 10,925 individuals from the National Income Dynamics Study between 2008
and 2014. We exploit the programme’s eligibility criteria to estimate instrumental variable Fixed Effects models.
Results: We find that receiving the Child Support Grant improves adult mental health by 0.822 points (on a 0–30
scale), 4.1% of the sample mean.
Conclusion: Our findings show that UCT programmes have strong mental health benefits for the poor adult
population.
Keywords: Mental health, Poverty, Cash transfer, Instrumental variable estimation, Fixed effects, South Africa
Background
About 1.1bn people worldwide suffer from mental health
problems. There is evidence of a strong relationship be-
tween poor mental health and poverty [28], which stands in
line with the social causation hypothesis that adverse socio-
economic factors precede and cause mental health prob-
lems [9]. The link between poverty and mental health
makes mental health a global development problem [36].
As unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programmes are
used to alleviate poverty, it is natural to investigate their ef-
fect on mental health.
One can use the Grossman model of health capital [17]
to hypothesise different possible effects of UCTs on men-
tal health. Health has a dual nature in the model. It is a
consumption good as it directly generates utility, but also
an investment good (human capital), required for income
generating activities. Based on the Grossman model, the
effect of UCTs on mental health can be positive, negative,
or null. The effect can be positive, as UCTs can increase
household income and thus directly increase mental
health investment opportunities or reduce the opportunity
cost of time for mental health investment activities. Re-
leasing the financial constraint can have an immediate dir-
ect effect on the psychological wellbeing of household
members by giving (more) financial security [27]. How-
ever, an increase in income can also potentially lead to
worse mental health outcomes through increased con-
sumption of unhealthy goods such as alcohol and conse-
quent worsening of and mental health in the long run
[14]. They can be ineffective as the monetary assistance
provided does not enforce behavioural changes, give infor-
mation or encourage investments in mental health.
A recent systematic review of the effects of cash trans-
fers on social determinants of health in the Sub-Saharan
Africa highlighted that cash transfers, both conditional
and unconditional, have shown potential to improve men-
tal health [33]. However, there is limited and mixed
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evidence on the quantitative effects of UCTs on mental
health. Two studies from South America have found no
significant effects of UCTs on mental health [13, 34], four
studies from Sub-Saharan Africa identified positive effects
on mental health [5, 11, 13, 20], whereas one study from
Sub-Saharan Africa identified only significant effects for
male adolescents but not female adolescents [22].
Existing studies focus on small samples of females or ad-
olescents and fail to identify the population-wide effects of
UCTs on mental health. They are either cross-sectional or
short-term analyses and do not to provide information on
the long-term effects of UCTs on mental health. Both
pieces of information are important for policy makers
aiming at sustainably improve mental health in LMICs
[30]. Our research aims to fill these gaps in the literature.
We contribute to the literature by estimating the effects
of the South African Child Support Grant (CSG) UCT
programme on the mental health of a representative sample
of the poor adult population from South Africa. We use as
measure for mental health the Centre for Epidemiological
Depression Scale (CES-D). We further extend the literature
by using longitudinal data covering information about indi-
viduals up to 6 years which is unique in the existing litera-
ture. The CSG is South Africa’s largest social cash transfer
programme and a long-term UCT programme. We focus
on South Africa in the analysis for the high prevalence of
mental health disorders in the country, with one in six of
the population suffering from depression or anxiety
[35].Unipolar depression has the highest prevalence of all
mental illnesses among the South African population con-
tributing to 5.8% of the overall burden of disease, which is
1.5 times higher compared to other Low- and Middle-
Income Countries (LMICs) [21].
We use data from four waves (2008–2014) of the
South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)
on 10,925 individuals living in poor households. We ad-
dress selection into the CSG programme using eligibility
as an instrument for grant receipt and account for unob-
served individual heterogeneity in mental health by using
Fixed Effects models. We find that the UCT programme
improves adult mental health by 0.822 points (on a 0–30
scale) corresponding to 4.1% of the sample mean. The
CSG effect on mental health is heterogeneous by gender,
with only significant effects for females. Our study is the
first to provide evidence on the effect of UCT pro-
grammes on adult mental health in general, showing
that UCT can have strong positive effects.
The paper is structured as follows: the first section
presents the study background, the second section de-
scribes the UCT programme, the third section describes
the data, the fourth section describes the methods, the
fifth section presents the descriptive statistics and re-
sults, and the sixth section discusses the results and
concludes.
The child support Grant (CSG) programme
The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced by the
South African Government in 1998 as part of the gov-
ernmental social assistance programme [39]. The CSG is
a UCT and the South Africa’s largest social cash transfer
programme, targeting the poor and vulnerable popula-
tion [16]. The CSG aim is to reduce poverty and vulner-
ability among children from poor socio-economic
backgrounds by monthly grant transfers to their primary
caregivers, which in most cases is the biological mother
of the child [11].
Eligibility for programme participation is defined by
two factors: (1) the age of the child; and (2) a means-test
of the caregiver and his/her spouse’s income and assets.
The primary caregiver is defined as the main responsible
person for the child and his/her daily needs [35]. The
cash transfer is substantial for poor households, as it in-
creases household income by about 20–25% [16]. The
coverage of the CSG increased over time [16], as illus-
trated in Table A1 in the Additional file 1. Initially, only
children up until the age of 7 years were targeted, but
the programme has been progressively extended over
time to children of age up to 18 years. The income
threshold was also lifted at a faster rate than price-
inflation, from R2,300 (US$172.5) to R3,200 (US$240),
leading to a positive real appreciation of the grant value.
This makes the CSG a suitable cash transfer programme
to identify the average effects of unconditional cash trans-
fers on the poor adult population. The CSG represents a
monetary shock to the average poor household in South
Africa, which contains on average three to four children
[44]. Additionally, evidence shows that although targeted
at children, the transfers are shared at the household level
[8, 10] raising the possibility of within household spill-
over effects on all members.
The actual receipt of the CSG ultimately depends on
eligible caregiver decisions as they must register. Selec-
tion into the programme is an important issue as chil-
dren eligible and in need may miss out on the support.
Recent studies show that about 27% of the eligible chil-
dren have not received the grant [16]. We discuss the se-
lection problem in more detail in section 5.3.
The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)
Survey structure and coverage
We use four waves of data from the National Income
Dynamics Study (NIDS; 2008–2014). The NIDS is a
biennial longitudinal survey of a nationally representa-
tive sample of the South African population [40]. A two-
stage cluster sample design was used [26]. Stratification
was made at the district council level and clustering was
implemented by primary sampling unit (geographical
areas consisting of at least one enumeration area within
the district council level). The first wave of the survey
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was conducted between January and December 2008
and consisted of 28,226 individuals (9605 children and
18,621 adults) from 7296 households. The same individ-
uals were re-interviewed and new household members
were included in the following waves. We use the adult
sample of the survey which includes all individuals of
age 15 years and above (average age 39) at the time of
the survey interview. We include in our analysis only in-
dividuals that are observed at least twice across waves.
Across all waves we use the lower income groups of
the NIDS defined by the 2008 CSG income-eligibility
lower-upper bound threshold of R800 (US$60) per
capita per month in 2008. This is the sample for which
the CSG eligibility criteria are satisfied. In doing so, we
use the sample of poor individuals, as the lower-upper
CSG bound is close to the upper-bound of national pov-
erty line in 2014 of R779 (US$58) [43]. The sample of
individuals with an income below the upper poverty
threshold in 2014 satisfies the means-test used for the
CSG as the upper poverty threshold is always lower.
Mental health measure
We measure mental health using a validated 10-item
version of the Centre for Epidemiological Depression
Scale (CES-D) scale developed by Radloff [37]. The CES-
D scale is a continuous variable that is scored from 0 to
30 with higher scores implying worse mental health.
However, for ease of interpretation, we invert the scale
of the CES-D ranging from zero (high depression and
worst mental health status) to 30 (no depression and
best mental health status).
The CES-D is a robust and clinically validated measure
for depression that has been widely applied in the ana-
lysis of cash transfer effects on mental health [13, 20, 22,
34]. It is based on measures self-reported by the partici-
pants and collected in every wave of the NIDS. The
CES-D scale has been used in a wide set of longitudinal
studies and is a validated measure for the poorer popula-
tions living in South Africa [6].
Treatment variable and instrument
The explanatory variable of interest is a binary variable
taking value one if an individual lives in a household in
which at least one person receives the CSG grant and
zero otherwise, and is based on individuals’ reports. We
use a binary instrumental variable which takes value one
if the individual lives in a household which has at least
one child of eligible age to receive the CSG, and zero if
the individual lives in a household without a CSG-age-
eligible child. This age-eligibility binary variable has been
used as an instrumental variable for CSG-receipt in pre-
vious research [12].
Control variables
As mental health is influenced by life events [1], we add a
binary variable indicating if the death of a household
member had occurred in the past 2 years. We add a vari-
able indicating the number of household members to con-
trol for social isolation, which is associated with poor
mental health outcomes [1], and for differences in house-
hold size between CSG-receiving and non-receiving
households [10]. Other variables commonly used to proxy
social capital, such as social interaction or group member-
ship, are not available throughout the waves. We include
age to account for the association between age and mental
health problems and age squared because of the inverted
U-shape in the age distribution of wellbeing [7]. Individ-
uals aged 15–18 years old, are potentially eligible to re-
ceive the CSG on their own behalf. To control for any
variation in mental health for this specific group, we add a
binary variable indicating if the individual is aged below
19 years. We include gender, as the literature shows differ-
ences in mental health and in cash transfer programme ef-
fects on mental health by gender [22].
We control for whether an individual is the economic
decision maker responsible for investment and expend-
iture decisions of a household, as research has found a
negative relationship between being responsible of eco-
nomic decision making and perceived stress in low in-
come settings [31].
At a community level, poor intangible assets are found
to be associated with poor mental health [51], we con-
trol for neighbourhood effects using a categorical vari-
able indicating the frequency of burglary in the
neighbourhood. We include a set of binary variables in-
dicating the level of common burglary and presence of
theft in the neighbourhood of the respondent (none,
very rare, not common, fairly common or very common)
and use none as baseline.
Variations across the provinces of South Africa in terms
of rurality and in terms of poverty are large and correlated
with mental health [28, 43]. Moreover take-up of the CSG
varies by provinces, with Gauteng and North West show-
ing the highest exclusion of children from CSG receipt
[47]. We use a set of province binary variables using Lim-
popo as baseline to control for the province of an individ-
ual (Limpopo, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern
Cape, for Free State, Kwa Zulu-West, North West, Gau-
teng, and Mpumalanga). We also include a set of binary
variables to control for whether the individual lives in a
formal rural setting, a tribal authority area, or an urban
formal or urban informal (township) setting. Control-
ling for rural and informal urban areas is also import-
ant as CSG-receipt is lower in these areas where
individuals are less likely to sign up due to poor rep-
resentation and distance to local authorities and the
increased cost of travel [10].
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Individuals are also eligible to apply for other govern-
ment grants alongside the CSG [39]. To control for any
contamination effects of the other grants on the CSG ef-
fect on mental health, we add a set of four binary vari-
ables for whether the individual lives in a household that
receives any of the other main support programmes
(Foster Care Grant (FCG), the Disability Grant (DG), the
Care Dependency Grant (CDG), or the Old Age Pension
(OAP)). We further include a set of 19 binary variables
of child age to all estimations. These 19 binary variables
indicate if children of age [0, 18] live in the household of
the respondent and consequently will pick up any pos-
sible variation of the instrumental variable with mental
health induced age of the cohabiting children.
Methods
Pooled cross-sectional model estimation
In order to investigate the association between CSG
household receipt and mental health, we estimate the
following OLS model:
CESi;t ¼ β0 þ β1CSGi;t þ X i;tβ2 þ Tiβ3þRiβ4 þ vi;t;
ð1Þ
where CESi, t is the CES-D score of the individual i in
year t. The CES-D score was assessed in all four waves
of the NIDS. CSGi, t is a binary variable indicating if an
individual lives in a CSG-receiving household. X is a
vector of control variables which includes, Ti is a set of
year dummies to control for time trend effects and Ri is
a set of regional dummy variables to control for regional
variations.
We cluster standard errors on the primary sampling
unit in all models because common cluster effects may
occur at local level [49]. We also test for potential attri-
tion effects in all models by including a dummy variable
taking on a value of one if the individual left the survey
due to death or other reasons in the following wave and
zero otherwise [48]. We provide an analysis of sample
attrition and sample transition (leaving the “poor” sam-
ple or moving into the “poor” sample) in section A3 of
the Additional file 1.
Fixed effect estimation
The OLS estimation could be downwardly biased be-
cause of potential unobserved individual heterogeneity
in mental health driven by unobservable behaviours and
preferences [19]. We account for unobserved individual
time-invariant heterogeneity in mental health using
Fixed Effects (FE). By doing so, we focus on variation
within individuals over time. FE address the correlation
of the beta-coefficient with the unobserved individual
component of the error term vit = ai + ui, t. ai is the un-
observable time-invariant component and ui, t is the
time-varying component, uncorrelated with the covari-
ates, of the individual error term. FE account for time
invariant determinants such as traumatic events, adverse
childhood events or genetic health endowments which
are important in shaping mental health but are not ob-
served [15]. Therefore, we formally estimate:
CESi;t ¼ a0 þ a1CSGi;t þ X i;tα2 þ Tiα3 þ Riα4 þ ai þ ui;t
ð2Þ
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation
Selection into the CSG programme can occur for several
reasons: exclusion errors occur due to lack of informa-
tion about the programme, incomplete documents, dis-
tance to local authorities and related opportunity costs
and travel costs, or the lack of proof of eligibility of the
child’s age and identity [8, 10, 16]. Furthermore, individ-
uals with poorer mental health outcomes could be less
likely to apply for the grant. Therefore, omitted variable
bias can affect the estimate of the effect on mental
health. Selection bias could downwardly bias the esti-
mated treatment effects.
We address selection into the CSG programme by
using an instrumental variable approach, which is an ap-
propriate method to deal with selection due to unob-
servable factors [4]. We instrument the binary variable
of living in a CSG receiving household with a binary
measure taking value one if at least one child eligible for
the CSG grant lives in the household and zero otherwise.
Our instrumental variable satisfies the two criterions of
relevance and validity required for causal inference [4].
It is relevant for the strong significant associations of the
instrumental variable with CSG-receipt in all first-stage
regressions. It is valid as our various applied tests find
strong support for the exclusion assumption to hold, e.g.
the instrumental variable effects mental health only
through CSG-receipt and the instrumental variable satis-
fies the conditional independence assumption. We
present a more detailed discussion and the different ap-
plied tests in section A2 of the Additional file 1.
As we use a binary instrumental variable for a binary
endogenous variable, we effectively estimate the Wald-
Estimator [4]. Using eligibility criteria as instrumental
variable for programme participation is common in the
literature [3]. The age-eligibility of a child has also been
used as instrument for CSG participation at the
individual-level in a previous analysis [12].
We use the parametric standard 2-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimator with both stages estimated simultan-
eously, first with pooled and then with FE specification
and compare the results. FE 2SLS square estimation is
feasible as both the instrumented and the instrumental
variable vary over time. This approach has a clear
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strength as it allows accounting for time-invariant and
time-variant unobserved individual heterogeneity simultan-
eously and is the preferred approach in this analysis [24].
The first stage can be formalised as follows:
CSGi;t ¼ γ0 þ γ1Zi;t þ X i;tγ2 þ Tiγ3þRiγ4þai þ ui;t
ð3Þ
where Zi, t is the instrumental variable. We use linear
probability models throughout the estimation.
In the second stage we regress CES-D on the linear
prediction of CSGi, t from the first stage and the full set
of covariates Xi, t.
CESi;t ¼ c0 þ c1 dCSGi;t þ X i;tc2 þ Tic3þRic4þai þ ui;t
ð4Þ
c1is the effect of the instrumented CSGi, t in the first
stage estimation. As in equation (4.1), X is a vector of
control variables, Ti is a set of year dummies, Ri is a set
of regional dummy variables. We show in section A2
that our instrumental variable approach satisfies the
conditions to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on
the Treated, which implies that results can be general-
ised to the full study population rather than to comply-
ing individuals [2].
Heterogeneity of the effect by gender
We investigate heterogeneous effects by gender because
there is evidence of gender differences in the effect of
UCT on mental health [22]. We follow Kilburn et al.
[22] and provide sub-sample estimates of our models to
make them comparable with this study.
Robustness checks
We carry out a number of robustness checks on the ef-
fects of attrition, on the threshold applied to identify
poor (R800), on the assumption of sharing the cash
grant within the household, a placebo-treatment receipt
estimation to test anticipation effects and a test regres-
sing mental health on child-eligibility using financially
non-eligible households only. The last test is especially
important as a non-significant coefficient for child-
eligibility would support firstly the causality of cash
transfer effects on mental health and secondly the as-
sumption that child-age does not affect mental health
directly (e.g. support the validity of the instrumental
variable). We discuss the different robustness checks in
more detail in section A4 of the Additional file 1.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by wave for the 10,
925 individuals in the full sample. The average
respondent is in moderate to poor mental health. Ap-
proximately 75% of individuals live in households receiv-
ing CSG and about 87% live in a household that is
eligible to receive the CSG. This is consistent with previ-
ous studies [8, 10, 12, 16, 18] and is evidence of potential
selection into the CSG, as in about 50% of the non-
recipient households there is at least one eligible child.
Every third person in the sample is male. The average
respondent is about 39 years old and lives with six other
individuals together in a household in a moderately safe
neighbourhood. About 13% of individuals in the sample
are younger than 19 years of age. One in nine house-
holds has experienced the death of a household member
in the past 2 years. 38% of the individuals report to have
at least one individual in their household who receives
the old age pension, 12% the disability grant, 5% the fos-
ter care grant and 1% the care dependency grant.
Splitting the samples by waves shows the increase in
the coverage of the CSG policy nationwide, with increas-
ing numbers of individuals living in CSG receiving and/
or in a CSG eligible household over time. Mental health
improves slightly from an average of 19.0 points in 2008
to an average of 20.4 points in 2014. Table A2 discussed
in section A1 of the Additional file 1 compares individ-
uals living in recipient and non-recipient households.
We observe slightly higher CES-D scores for individuals
living in receiving households (19.89 vs 19.37), similar-
ities in other grant receipt and disparities in household
composition with more household members, more fe-
male household members and lower mean age in receiv-
ing households. Statistical difference in means of control
variables between individuals living in CSG-receiving
households and non-recipient households suggest the
potential absence of random selection of CSG-receipt.
Pooled versus fixed effects
Table 2 reports the results of the pooled and FE estima-
tion. We find a positive and significant effect on mental
health for individuals living in a CSG receiving house-
hold across the models. In the pooled model without co-
variates in column (1), individuals living in a CSG
receiving household have on average a 0.325 point
higher CES-D score than individuals living in non-
recipient households.
Controlling for all covariates in the pooled model in col-
umn (2) the coefficient increases to 0.405. This implies a
2% increase in CES-D score compared to the mean of
CES-D. When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in
the models using FE without and with covariates in col-
umns (3) and (4), results show that the size of the coeffi-
cient increases, and it remains statistically significant. This
indicates a downward bias in the pooled OLS estimate
due to correlation of the main explanatory variable with
unobservable idiosyncratic factors. The coefficient size
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Table 1 Summary statistics 2008–2014
Variables Definition 2008
n = 6801
2010
n = 7831
2012
n = 7818
2014
n = 6323
All years
n = 10,925
Outcome Variable
CES-D Centre for Epidemiological Depression Scale ranging
from 0 to 30; higher values indicate better mental health
18.99
(4.39)
20.07
(4.00)
20.12
(4.28)
20.36
(4.04)
19.90 (4.21)
Main Explanatory Variable
Household CSG 1 if individual lives in a CSG- receiving household,
0 otherwise
0.65 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.76
Instrumental variable
Household with CSG
eligible child
1 if a child eligible for the CSG lives in the household,
0 otherwise (including no children)
0.83 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.87
Covariates
Male 0 if female, 1 if male 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.32
Age The age of the individual in years 37.58
(17.64)
37.86
(18.18)
38.61
(18.00)
40.96
(17.69)
38.68 (17.94)
Age under 19 1 if the individual is < 19 years of age, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.13
Econ. decision maker 1 if the individual is the economic decision maker
of the household, 0 otherwise
0.39 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.41
Size of the household The number of household members 5.91
(3.17)
6.62
(3.82)
6.60 (3.79) 6.55
(3.53)
6.43 (3.61)
Death in household 1 if a household member has died in the past 2
years, 0 otherwise
0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.15
Household OAG 1 if individual lives in an Old Age Pension -receiving
household, 0 otherwise
0.32 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.38
Household DG 1 if individual lives in a DG-receiving household,
0 otherwise
0.15 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
Household FCG 1 if individual lives in a FCG-receiving household,
0 otherwise
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
Household CDG 1 if individual lives in a CDG-receiving household,
0 otherwise
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Neighbourhood Theft 0 “never happens in neighbourhood”, 1 “very rare
in neighbourhood”, 2 “not common in neighbourhood”,
3 “fairly common in neighbourhood”, 4 “very common
in neighbourhood”
1.88
(1.49)
1.84
(1.38)
2.26 (1.43) 2.21
(1.48)
2.05 (1.45)
Region The baseline is “Rural formal”
Tribal Authority Area 1 if the individual lives in a tribal authority area, 0
otherwise
0.53 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.54
Urban Formal 1 if the individual lives in an urban formal area, 0
otherwise
0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30
Urban Informal
(Townships)
1 if the individual lives in an urban informal area, 0
otherwise
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Province The baseline is “Limpopo”
Western Cape 1 if the individual lives in Western Cape, 0 otherwise 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Eastern Cape 1 if the individual lives in Eastern Cape, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Northern Cape 1 if the individual lives in Northern Cape, 0 otherwise 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Free State 1 if the individual lives in Free State, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
KwaZulu-West 1 if the individual lives in KwaZulu-West, 0 otherwise 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.35
North West 1 if the individual lives in North West, 0 otherwise 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
Gauteng 1 if the individual lives in Gauteng, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Mpumalanga 1 if the individual lives in Mpumalanga, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Note: Descriptive statistics are on the sample of the estimated models. n indicates the number of individuals. Variable means (standard deviations
when applicable)
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reported in column (4) is 0.536, which indicates a 2.7% in-
crease in CES-D from the mean of CES-D.
In both the pooled and FE models, being younger
than 19 years of age is associated with better mental
health. In the FE model age has a positive non-linear
association with mental health. Males have on average
a significantly better mental health than females in
the pooled model. In the pooled model, age has a
non-linear, and positive above 30 years, association
with mental health. In the pooled model, mental
health is better in households of larger size. Economic
decision making and negative events are both nega-
tively associated with mental health.
Notably, attrition is significantly and negatively associated
with transfer receipt in the pooled model in column (2). How-
ever, when using FE estimation this association loses statistical
significance which tells us that FE address the correlation of
attrition with unobservable factors determining mental health.
We perform a Hausman test to determine if FE or
Random Effects models should be used. The Hausman
test rejects the null hypothesis p < 0.001 in favour of the
FE estimation.
2SLS and 2SLS FE estimation
The estimates of the first stage regression of the different
instrumental variable models are presented in Table 3, for
Table 2 Effect of CSG on mental health: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS
without covariates
Pooled OLS
with covariates
FE
without covariates
FE
with covariates
Household CSG 0.325*** 0.405*** 0.449*** 0.536***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.119) (0.126)
Male 0.346***
(0.051)
Age −0.076*** 0.136*
(0.009) (0.080)
Age Squared 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Age under 19 0.513*** 0.385**
(0.097) (0.169)
Economic decision maker −0.143** 0.037
(0.061) (0.082)
Household Size 0.048** 0.045
(0.022) (0.038)
Negative Event −0.215** −0.048
(0.094) (0.116)
Neighbourhood Theft −0.036 0.034
(0.030) (0.035)
Attrition −0.194** 0.014
(0.098) (0.132)
Constant 18.778*** 21.323*** 18.759*** 12.149***
(0.122) (0.324) (0.131) (3.031)
Year YES YES YES YES
Other Government Programmes No YES No YES
Child Age Dummy No YES No YES
Province No YES No YES
Region No YES No YES
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773
Individuals 10,925 10,925
R-squared 0.016 0.066 0.020 0.025
The outcome variable is CES-D (0–30) the measure for depression; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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the whole population in columns (1) to (4) including
pooled OLS without and with covariates and FE estima-
tions without and with covariates, and FE estimation for
male and female separately in columns (5) and (6). The re-
gression of the household level CSG receipt on the instru-
mental variable in the top row of the table shows positive
significant effects throughout all specifications.
The magnitude of the coefficient of the instrumental
variable varies over the specifications with highest magni-
tude for the 2SLS estimation without covariates (0.833).
Adding covariates to the OLS estimation in model (2) re-
duces the coefficient to 0.723, indicating correlation of the
instrumental variable with other factors. When using FE
with 2SLS estimation without covariates, the magnitude is
further reduced to 0.712, which indicates that FE account
for unobservable constant factors. Adding covariates in
model (4) to the FE estimation further reduces the magni-
tude of the coefficient to 0.644. The estimated coefficient
gives the compliance rate for the group of transfer recipi-
ents with the instrumental variable. The compliance rate
Table 3 Effect of eligibility on CSG receipt: First Stage 2SLS, Fixed effect 2SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage 2SLS without
covariates
First Stage 2SLS with
covariates
First Stage FE without
covariates
First Stage FE with
covariates
First Stage FE
Male
First Stage FE
Female
CSG eligible child 0.833*** 0.723*** 0.712*** 0.644*** 0.636*** 0.643***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017)
Male −0.021***
(0.004)
Age 0.001 0.011** 0.002 0.014**
(0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Age Squared −0.000** −0.000* 0.000 −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age under 19 −0.007 0.012 −0.003 0.017
(0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014)
Economic decision
maker
0.003 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007)
Household Size −0.001 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Negative Event −0.010 0.005 0.002 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
Neighbourhood
Theft
0.003 −0.001 −0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Attrition −0.010 −0.005 0.013 −0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Constant −0.038*** − 0.040
(0.007) (0.026)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other Government
Support
NO YES NO YES YES YES
Child Age Dummy NO YES NO YES YES YES
Province NO YES NO YES YES YES
Region NO YES NO YES YES YES
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773 9147 19,626
Individuals 10,925 10,925 3723 7202
R-squared 0.443 0.482 0.277 0.305 0.349 0.286
The outcome variable is a binary variable indicating if the individual lives in a CSG-receiving household or not; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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shown in model (1) is 83%, which implies that 83% of the
recipients comply in their treatment status conditional on
the instrumental variable.
Table 4 presents the findings of the second stage of
the pooled and FE instrumental variable estimations for
the same six models. The coefficient associated with the
CSG is positive and significant in all models, except for
the one estimated on the male sub-sample where it is
not statistically significant (p = 0.392).
In column (1) the effect of living in a receiving CSG
household on mental health outcome, estimated using
pooled 2SLS, increases mental health by about half a unit
on the CES-D scale (0.614) compared to individuals living
in non-receiving household. The magnitude of the effect
is higher (0.749) in model (2) when controlling in the
pooled 2SLS estimation for confounding factors in the de-
termining mental health. The FE 2SLS estimation in col-
umn (3) shows a marginally larger magnitude compared
to the 2SLS with a coefficient of size 0.621 which is a 15%
standard deviation increase in mental health. The margin-
ally larger size of the coefficient in column (3) compared
to column (1) shows that the 2SLS estimation without
Table 4 Effect of CSG on mental health: Second Stage 2SLS, Fixed Effect 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS without
covariates
2SLS with
covariates
FE 2SLS without
covariates.
FE 2SLS with
covariates
FE 2SLS
Male
FE 2SLS
Female
Household CSG 0.614*** 0.749*** 0.621*** 0.822*** 0.468 1.000***
(0.125) (0.152) (0.231) (0.279) (0.447) (0.323)
Male 0.368***
(0.051)
Age −0.077*** 0.133* 0.087 0.146
(0.009) (0.080) (0.146) (0.092)
Age Squared 0.001*** 0.001* −0.001 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age under 19 0.517*** 0.380** 0.734** 0.143
(0.098) (0.169) (0.288) (0.214)
Economic decision
maker
−0.135** 0.041 −0.073 0.028
(0.061) (0.082) (0.156) (0.110)
Household Size 0.053** 0.042 0.014 0.057
(0.022) (0.037) (0.067) (0.039)
Negative Event −0.208** −0.050 0.386** −0.215*
(0.094) (0.115) (0.161) (0.129)
Neighbourhood Theft −0.036 0.034 0.043 0.032
(0.030) (0.035) (0.047) (0.038)
Attrition −0.187* 0.015 −0.117 0.088
(0.098) (0.132) (0.194) (0.152)
Constant 18.588*** 21.169***
(0.128) (0.326)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other Government
Support
NO YES NO YES YES YES
Child Age Dummy NO YES NO YES YES YES
Province NO YES NO YES YES YES
Region NO YES NO YES YES YES
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773 9147 19,626
Individuals 10,925 10,925 3723 7202
R-squared 0.015 0.065 0.019 0.025 0.026 0.029
The outcome variable is CES-D (0–30) the measure for depression; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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covariates in (1) is downwardly biased due to unobserved
heterogeneous factors.
Adding control variables in the FE 2SLS estimation in
column (4) shows a transfer effect of size 0.822 on individ-
uals’ mental health which is a 4.1% improvement in the
mean value of mental health. The 2SLS coefficient of
transfer receipt without FE shows low variation with and
without conditioning on covariates whereas in the 2SLS
estimation with FE it shows significant difference condi-
tioning on covariates and without covariates. An explan-
ation is that covariates are correlated with unobservable
factors adding bias to the estimation, which we address by
using individual FE model. The CSG effect is not signifi-
cant for the male sub-sample in column (5) and the stron-
gest cash transfer effect amongst all models is observed in
the female sub-sample in column (6) with an improve-
ment on the CES-D scale of one unit or an increase in
mental health of 5 %.
The FE 2SLS model with covariates in column (4) is twice
the size of the pooled model coefficient in column (2) of
Table 2, indicating a potential downwardly bias of the
pooled model-coefficient due to unobserved heterogeneity
in mental health. The bias remains when controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity in health but not instrumenting
for the treatment receipt as the coefficient size of the FE in
column (4) of Table 2 is still 0.3 points lower than the one
estimated with FE 2SLS in column (4) of Table 4.
When controlling for determinants of mental health,
the following coefficients estimated with the pooled
2SLS in column (2) are associated with mental health.
We find positive significant effects for being under 19
years of age, being male and the size of the household.
Significant negative associations for age (though with in-
creasing positive non-linear age effects), economic deci-
sion making in a household, death of a household
member and attrition. The attrition dummy is only sig-
nificant in the pooled model. This indicates for the FE
models that individuals who leave the survey for reasons
of death or non-response are not systematically biasing
the estimation.
We find in the FE model in column (4) a positive sig-
nificant association of age with mental health. Both FE
models in columns (4) and (5) show a positive effect of
being under 19 years of age on mental health. The FE
model for males in column (5) shows positive effects of
negative events on male mental health. In contrast the
FE model for females in column (6) identifies negative
associations of negative events with mental health.
We test the statistical strength of the instrumental
variable in all presented models. The results from these
tests emphasise and support the statistical strength of
our instrumental variable in all 2SLS models. In all first-
stage regressions is the endogenous regressor neither
weakly nor under-identified by the instrumental variable
(F-statistics > 10) [41]. For brevity, we present in the fol-
lowing only results from the preferred FE 2SLS model in
brackets, however the findings apply to all 2SLS models.
Since only one instrumental variable is applied, the F-
test, the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test, and
Kleibergen-Paap test are similar [4, 23]. The tests reject
the null hypothesis at the 99% level (F = 633.76 Prob
>F < 0.001). Since we can reject the null hypothesis, the
instrument is strong and adequate [41]. Both the Stock-
Wright and the Anderson-Rubin Wald test specifications
tests reject the null hypothesis (Stock-Wright: p =
0.00212; Anderson-Rubin Wald test p = 0.0159), indicat-
ing that endogenous regressors are relevant. The critical
value of the Stock-Yogo ID which is 16.38 and indicates
a weak instrument threshold is far below the F-statistics
(10% = 16.38 < 633.75) indicating a strong instrument
[45]. The endogeneity test (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test or
short Hausman form) is not rejected (t = 1.162, p =
0.2810). This tells us that self-selection is not based on
mental health characteristics.
Robustness checks
Our robustness checks show that the results are robust
to sample selection and attrition, that mental health ef-
fects remain strong when actual cash transfer recipients
are excluded from the sample estimation, which sup-
ports the argument of cash-transfer sharing on the
household level, and that no placebo-effects of cash
transfer receipt occur, supporting the claim that no an-
ticipation effects occur. We find further strong support
for the causality of cash transfer effects on mental health
and the exclusion assumption (e.g. validity) of the instru-
mental variable to hold as living with a child in the CSG
age-eligibility brackets in non-poor households (income
above Rand800 and not applicable to apply for the CSG
programme) has no statistically significant effect on
mental health. An elaborate discussion of the findings
from the robustness analysis is presented in section A5
of the Additional file 1.
Discussion
This is the first study to analyse the effect of a large un-
conditional cash transfer programme (UCT), the South
African Child Support Grant, on mental health of adults,
rather than specific population sub-groups, living in pov-
erty. We use a large longitudinal sample of 10,925 indi-
viduals from four waves (2008–2014) of the National
Income Dynamics Study, a representative survey of the
South African population. We measure mental health
with the Centre for Epidemiological Depression (CES-D)
scale. Using a Fixed Effect instrumental variable ap-
proach to account for potential selection bias into the
CSG, we find that the cash transfer has a strong positive
effect on mental health of individuals living in recipient
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households by half a unit on a 30-point scale. We con-
ducted sub-analyses by gender and identify a significant
effect, only for females, twice the size of the male coeffi-
cient. Our results are robust to potential attrition, sam-
ple selection and placebo-effects. Our instrumental
variable is relevant and statistically strong. Our various
tests around the validity of the instrumental variable
show all overwhelming evidence for the instrument’s val-
idity to hold.
The finding of positive effects of a UCT on mental
health fits into the behavioural economics and psycho-
social literature on the relationship between poverty and
mental health conditions [27]. It is also in line with
firstly findings from studies analysing the short-term ef-
fects of UCTs on mental health on sub-populations from
LMICs [5, 11, 20, 35] and secondly within the wider
qualitative and quantitative literature on the effects of
cash transfers on mental health in Sub-Saharan Africa
[33].
Previous work on the effect of a UCT effect on adoles-
cent mental health found different disparities with sig-
nificant effects only for males [22]. The difference in
findings can be explained by the different design of the
cash transfer programmes. Kilburn et al. [22] used a
UCT with a short-term horizon whereas the CSG is a
long-term support programme. Differences can also
occur due to the different sample populations. Kilburn
et al. [22] used a sample of adolescents whereas our ana-
lysis contributed by using an adult sample. Our findings
of significant effects fit into the epidemiological litera-
ture on the burden of mental health among the females.
Female mental health is possibly more responsive to the
UCT as women are at higher risk for common mental
health disorders with 50% higher prevalence of depres-
sion for women [50].
The main challenge of this paper is that the
programme is not randomly assigned. Our instrumental
variable approach with Fixed Effects accounts for selec-
tion effects. The advantage of using a natural experiment
like the CSG is the external validity of its implication for
studying the mental health effects of cash transfer pro-
grammes. A limitation of instrumental variable estima-
tion is the assumption that the instrumental variable
only affects mental health through the endogenous vari-
able and does not affect mental health directly and can
be excluded from the mental health equation. This as-
sumption untestable [4]. We found a range of evidence
to support the validity of the exclusion assumption in
this case. We found no effects of child-age on mental
health, no effects using placebo-treatment estimations
for individuals living with age-eligible children in house-
holds that are not financially eligible for the CSG.
We considered the use of alternative instrumental var-
iables previously used in the literature as proxy for local
government investment and access to government ser-
vices, such as: distance to water sources from the house
or dwelling, municipal expenditures in the past 30 days,
household transport expenditures in the past 30 days, or
the council level density of CSG receiving children,
weighted by the number of council level residents.
None of these instruments were strong in predicting
receipt of CSG, while our chosen instrumental variable,
“household contains an eligible child”, is strong and valid
in explaining cash transfer receipt. This instrumental
variable varies exogenously over time because of the
changes to the eligibility threshold making it stronger
than a simple cross-section with a single eligibility criter-
ion. Furthermore, we conducted several tests to support
the validity and exclusion assumption of the instrumen-
tal variable.
We further presented strong arguments that our in-
strumental variable can be considered as good as ran-
domly distributed as manipulation of the variable can be
ruled out for the following reasons: firstly the exoge-
neous time-varying age-eligibility of the CSG, secondly
empirical evidence finding no difference in odds for
child birth between CSG-receiving an non receiving
mothers, thirdly evidence suggesting the economic costs
of bringing up children would be higher than the grant-
income, and fourthly trends in fertility rates in South Af-
rica remain unchanged after introduction of the CSG
programme [16, 38, 42, 46].
We considered alternative estimation methods such as
fuzzy regression discontinuity design using the age-
eligibility cut-offs [25]. However, such an approach
would not allow us to account for unobserved time in-
variant effects nor estimate population-wide mental
health effects of UCTs as this method relies on compar-
ing only a small subgroup of the population close to the
cut-off point with very similar characteristics.
The aim of this study was to understand the effects of
an UCT on mental health of the average poor adult popu-
lation. Due to the design of the CSG, which requires a
household to have an age-eligible child to receive the cash
transfer, results may be representative of households with
an eligible child, rather than a South African household.
However, this is an unlikely concern for the composition
of poor households in South Africa. In the average poor
South African household live between three and four chil-
dren, where children are defined as household members
below age 18 [44].
The finding highlights that UCTs have strong and ro-
bust direct positive benefits for mental health of adult
populations from LMICs. Following the Grossman
model of health where more healthy time is an input
factor of individual productivity [17], better mental
health can enable individuals to improve their productiv-
ity which can then contribute to decrease poverty in the
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long-term. The effects of better mental health could pos-
sibly show strong spill-over effects on other dimensions,
especially when considering the strong co-morbidities of
mental with physical health and the strong relationship
of mental health with poverty [28, 32].
Conclusion
Our findings of strong positive effects of a UCT on men-
tal health in South Africa have important implications
for policies in LMICs. Firstly, UTCs have strong poten-
tial to reduce depressive symptoms among poor popula-
tions which is important in settings such as South Africa
where unipolar depression is the main contributor
among mental diseases to the overall burden of disease
[21]. Secondly, in the South African context, population
wide improvements in mental health could show signifi-
cant effects on HIV-prevalence, due to the strong posi-
tive correlation between the two [29]. Thirdly, UCTs can
be a relatively simple approach of dealing with the high
burden of disease due to common mental health disor-
ders such as depression in LMICs. They could have po-
tential to overcome the big treatment gaps in mental
health care by reducing the need for health care in set-
tings where a substantial undersupply of trained health
staff and mental health treatment facilities exists [29].
Whilst our research has established a positive effect of
a UCT on mental health over a period of 6 years, with
most individuals exposed to the UCT throughout that
time, more research is required to understand long-term
effects of UCTs on mental health beyond this period.
Further should future research focus on understanding
the heterogeneous effects of different amounts of UCTs
on population-wide mental health.
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